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Abstract This paper proposes a mechanism to overcome the possibility that politi-
cal parties may block the nomination of High-Court judges when the Parliament is
involved in their nomination and their mandate expires on a fixed date. This possibility
arises when the default option is that the judge whose mandate expires holds office
until an agreement is reached. Our proposal consists of changing the default option by
a weighted lottery, related to the shares in Parliament of the different parties. We show
that this mechanism is capable of solving the problem under reasonable conditions
and implementing a politically balanced solution.




There are a number of relevant instances when political parties have to agree on the
choice of candidates for some public institutions. This is the case in many countries
for regulatory committees, central bank councils or High Courts. A potential conflict
arises when candidates are nominated for a fixed period of office and the norm requires
a qualified majority for their nomination. In other words, we may find that the period
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of office of a member of such an institution expires but the parties do not reach an
agreement on the person that should replace him/her.
The origin of this paper lies in a real life problemof this sort: the difficulties involved
in replacing Spanish Constitutional Court judges over the last few years. This High
Court consists of twelve magistrates, eight of whom are chosen in Parliament (four in
each of the two Chambers).1 The Law establishes that 3/5 favourable votes in Parlia-
ment are needed for their nomination. In practice, this requires the consensus of the
two largest parties, as neither of them has ever had such a large share of Parliamentary
seats, and no other party has enough seats to enable them to reach the necessary share.
Each magistrate is appointed for a 9-year period, with a renewal rule that prescribes
that one third of the magistrates must be replaced every 3 years. The lack of consen-
sus arose as a major problem in 2007 (the Constitutional Court was established in
1980). Three magistrates stayed in office more than 3 years beyond their duty (and
one seat was empty due to the death of another magistrate who was not replaced).
Legislators never considered the possibility of such a long delay in the renewal of the
Constitutional Court. Indeed, it broke the established renewal pattern, as keeping to
the 9-year mandate entailed replacing two thirds of the magistrates on one occasion,
one third on next occasion, and none of them the third time. To prevent inconsistency,
the law that regulates the Constitutional Court had to be amended, introducing the
caveat that the extra period that a magistrate stayed in office was to be discounted
from the period of office of his/her substitute. That amendment somehow preserved
the renewal norm, even though now some magistrates will stay in office for twice as
long as others. Nonetheless, the main issue behind the undue extension of the magis-
trates’ mandate is one of legitimacy. The Spanish Constitutional Court has made very
important decisions in such anomalous circumstances, in particular sentences regard-
ing the nature of some Estatutos (the equivalent of the “constitutions” of the Spanish
Autonomous Regions). The result is a lack of confidence both in political parties and
legislators, the deterioration of the relationships between legislators and the judiciary,
and the dissemination of the idea that parties are more concerned about their relative
power than about serving citizens. The situation deteriorated so much that some of the
magistrates resigned, something unheard of in an institution of this kind.
This problem2 derives from the collision of two sensible principles that inspire the
norm, or rather from the way in which those principles are implemented. On the one
hand, each judge is designated for a fixed term, in order to prevent disproportionate
influence of specific individuals on the legal system. On the other, the rule establishes
that substituting a judge whose mandate expires requires a qualified majority in Par-
liament, in order to diminish the effects of the political cycle on the interpretation of
the fundamental norms.
The deadlock at which the system can arrive when a judge’s mandate expires and
Parliament does not have the majority required to approve a substitute, is directly
1 The other four magistrates are chosen by the Government and the by the Judges’ Council (Consejo
General del Poder Judicial).
2 The same problem also affected the Judges’ Council (Consejo General del Poder Judicial), where 20 of
its 21 members are to be appointed by Parliament. Note that France, Germany and Italy have similar ways
of choosing all or some of the judges of their Constitutional Courts.
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related to the choice of the status quo as the default option (i.e. the judge whose
mandate has expired stays in office until an agreement is reached). Such a default
option does not provide the right incentives to reach an agreement. The reason is
clear: if the ideology of the judge to be replaced is close to a given party, then this
party has no incentive to agree on a different candidate, unless he/she belongs to the
same ideological group. When this party is needed for the nomination but cannot
ensure a replacement that satisfies its interests, it will block the process.
Here we propose a simple mechanism that is respectful of Parliament and ensures a
judge’s timely replacement, by simply changing the default option. Once the judge’s
appointment expires, Parliament is required to make a proposal that satisfies the estab-
lished quota (3/5 in the case of the Spanish Constitutional Court). If there is agreement,
then the candidate is chosen, substitutes the exiting judge, and the process ends. This
part is consistent with the current procedure. If there is no agreement, then a weighted
lottery applies. Each party presents a candidate who enters a random choice mecha-
nism with a probability weight equal to the proposing party’s share in Parliament. The
weighted lottery is played and the chosen candidate will be determined by the lottery.
This mechanism is fair because it respects the distribution of power among parties.
Firstly, it is consistent with the current system provided that parties are able to reach
an agreement in due time. Secondly, when no agreement is reached, on average each
party will get its preferred candidate a fraction of times equal to the fraction of its
Parliamentary seats.
We show that, under reasonable conditions (single peaked preferences on the ide-
ological traits of the candidates) and a rich variety of candidates over the ideological
spectrum, the following holds:
(i) When status quo is the default option, disagreement is the natural outcome;
(ii) Whenparties are risk averse (or even risk neutral), theweighted lotterymechanism
induces agreement between parties before actually recurring to the lottery;
(iii) This two-stage mechanism implements the politically balanced alternative as a
Nash equilibrium; and
(iv) The results are robust to the case of bi-dimensional preferences (i.e. when parties
care about both the candidates’ ideology and their capabilities).
All those results are simple derivations of the non-cooperative theory of bargaining,
following the seminal work of Rubinstein (1982), and are closely related to legislative
bargaining and arbitration models (Baron and Ferejohn 1989; Banks and Duggan
2006; Cardona and Ponsati 2011; Mylovanov and Zapechelnyuk 2013). Yet they may
be useful in suggesting practical ways of solving a relevant problem.
The model aims at highlighting the essential ingredients of the problem and the
proposed solution, at the cost of depicting a highly simplified world. In particular: (a)
The model focuses on the replacement of one judge at a time; (b) There are only two
(relevant) political parties; (c) The utility function of political parties only depends on
the ideology of the candidate (a single dimensional variable) and, possibly, on his/her
ability (an observable variable that all parties perceive equally). We shall briefly refer
to those aspects later on (see Sect. 5).
The rest of the paper goes as follows. The next section sets up the reference model.
Section 3 presents the weighted lottery mechanism and characterizes its implications.
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Section 4 briefly elaborates on the consequences of taking not only judges’ ideology
into account, but also their competence. Finally, Sect. 5 concludes by discussing some
other aspects of the problem.
2 The status quo model
Let us consider, for the sake of simplicity, that Parliament consists of just two parties,
L and R. Parliament has to appoint a newHigh-Court judge by qualified majority p, to
replace one whose term is over. We assume that neither of the two parties has enough
seats in Parliament to reach the qualified majority required, so that they both have to
agree on the nomination. αi stands for the share of Parliamentary seats held by party
i = L , R, with αL < p and αR < p, respectively, and αL + αR = 1, p ∈ (0.5, 1].
The chosen candidate has to be selected from a pool of candidates in the ideological
space [0, 1]. Assume, for the time being, that all candidates are equally capable of
serving as judges (there is no quality dimension in the problem). The current incumbent
has ideology c0 ∈ [0, 1] and this individual will retain his position until an agreement
on her substitute has been reached. Each party has an ideological position defined by
a function Vi (c) that represents the value it assigns to selecting a judge of ideology c.
Let ci denote the preferred candidate of party i = L , R. That is, ci solves the problem
maxcVi (c) subject to c ∈ [0, 1]. We assume that preferences are single-peaked, that
is, the closer c to ci , the greater the utility of party i .
Let cL < cR, without loss of generality (that is, the closer c is to zero, the more
leftist is the chosen candidate).
We say that a candidate is politically balanced when his/her ideology reflects the
ideological composition of parliament. In otherwords, a politically balanced candidate
would be one with ideology cα = αLcL + αRcR .
Now assume that parties enter into a non-cooperative bargaining process in order to
select a candidate to replace an exiting judge. The process can go on for infinite-many
periods with the status quo c0 prevailing as the default option until a choice is made.
It is easy to show that, within this setting, indefinite disagreement is the most likely
outcome, irrespective of the negotiation protocol. Formally:
Proposition 1 If c0 ∈ (cL , cR) no agreement is reached and the status quo, c0,
prevails.
Proof To prove this result it is sufficient to consider that, regardless of the details of
the negotiation protocol, each party will always play the “safe” strategy of rejecting
any offer they receive and making no offer. This strategy ensures that parties obtain
VL(c0), VR(c0), respectively.
Consider, without loss of generality, a proposal cˆ made by party R. If party R found
it optimal to make the offer it is because VR(c0) < VR(cˆ). Moreover, since c0 < cR ,
then it necessarily follows that cˆ > c0. Now, from the perspective of party L , if the
rejection strategy is not optimal for this offer it is because VL(c0) < VL(cˆ) and this,
together with c0 > cL requires cˆ < c0, which is a contradiction.
A symmetric argument applies for party L making a proposal. unionsq
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This simple result shows that, unless the status quo is too extreme for both par-
ties, negotiations will fail. The reason is that, when the status quo is moderate, any
agreement different from c0 will imply a loss for one of the parties, preventing any
possibility of agreement. Only when the status quo is extreme for both parties there is
room for mutual benefit. That is, a necessary (yet not sufficient) condition for agree-
ment is that either c0 < cL or c0 > cR . That situation can only occur if the party that is
closest to c0 has changed ideology moving towards a more central part of the political
spectrum. Otherwise a candidate c0 would never have been chosen.
Therefore, when parties’ ideologies are stable, non-cooperation is the sure outcome.
3 Negotiations with deadline and a weighted lottery
We have seen that negotiations are most likely to fail when the status quo is the default
option. Let us define a different choice rule, by changing the default option, which
ensures that a new appointment will be obtained in due course, under reasonable
assumptions. We first present the rule and then analyse how this new default option
affects the possibility of reaching an agreement.
Consider the following two-stage rule:
• Stage 1: Parties open a bilateral negotiation process, in order to reach an agreement
with a fixed deadline. If an agreement is obtained, then the chosen candidate is
designated and the process ends. If there is no agreement within the established
period, we go to stage 2.
• Stage 2: The two parties are asked to simultaneously name their final candidates,




c fL with probability αL
c fR with probability αR
In order to see how agents behave, consider the final round. Each party will choose
c fi in such a way that:





with i = L , R, j = R, L . It is immediate that Eq. 1 yields c fi = ci . That is, each
party will propose its preferred candidate as a dominant strategy and there is no scope
for manipulating the selection of candidates.
Now the question becomes: is there room for an agreement? We shall see that the
answer is positive, provided agents are risk averse.
Let EV fi = αi Vi (ci )+(1−αi )Vi (c j ) be the expected benefit that each party obtains
from the final round. And let c˜i stand for the corresponding certainty equivalent (the
point in the ideological spectrum at maximum distance of party i’s ideal point, com-
patible with reaching an agreement in the first stage). By definition, c˜L and c˜R solve:
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max c








Let c(π) = cLπ + cR(1 − π), with π ∈ [0,1]. We say that party i is weakly
risk-averse (or has weakly risk-averse preferences) whenever
Vi (c(π)) ≥ πVi (cL) + (1 − π)Vi (cR), for all π ∈ [0, 1].
The following result is obtained:
Proposition 2 Assume that both parties have single-peaked and weakly risk-averse
preferences. Then, the weighted-lottery mechanism ensures that there is scope for an
agreement between the two parties in the first stage. Moreover, the balanced solution
cα is always in the set of mutually acceptable candidates.
Proof First, notice that a necessary condition for the weighted-lottery mechanism to
induce an agreement in the first stage is that the certainty equivalent of the left party
is not below that or the right party, that is, c˜L ≥ c˜R . Otherwise, there is no agreement
and the final round is reached.
Let us show now that c˜L ≥ cα ≥ c˜R , which trivially implies the condition above.
Take first party L . From the definition of c˜L we have that c˜L ≥ cα if and only if,
VL(cα) ≥ EV fL ⇔ VL(αLcL + αRcR) ≥ αL VL(cL) + αR VL(cR)
which is, precisely, the weak risk-aversion condition. The same logic applies for the
case of party R. unionsq
Proposition 2 says that, irrespective of the negotiation protocol, the weighted lottery
mechanism induces the parties to agree on an intermediate ideological level, c′ ∈
[c˜L , c˜R], without actually recurring to the lottery. Note that this result does not require
any particular functional form and holds for any single peaked and risk-averse or risk
neutral utility function.
The second part of Proposition 2 can be rephrased as follows:
Corollary 1 The choice of the balanced candidate can be implemented as a Nash
equilibrium by the weighted-lottery mechanism.
4 The choice problem when both ideology and ability matter
Consider now the more general case in which the parties’ preferences are bi-
dimensional: they care both about the ideology (c) and the ability (a) of the candidates.
Utilities, therefore, take the form Vi (c, a), for i ∈ {L , R}. We assume, as before, that
utilities are single peaked with respect to the ideological component. That is, Vi (c, a)
is increasing (resp. decreasing) in c provided c < ci (resp. c > ci ).
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Concerning the ability dimension we assume that utilities are increasing in a for
both parties, and that they agree on the measurement of ability, that varies in a compact
interval [amin, amax].3
The following result is quite straightforward,
Proposition 3 Assume that Vi (c, a) is single-peaked and risk-averse with respect to
c and increasing in a, for i = L , R. Then, the weighted-lottery mechanism induces an
agreement on some candidate c′ such that, there is no other candidate with ideology
c′ and a higher ability.
Proof Let amaxc denote the highest ability attainable for a candidate with ideology c.
As utilities are increasing in a for both parties, then a change from any a = amaxc
to amaxc would imply an increase in the value obtained by both parties. Therefore,
a = amaxc can never be an equilibrium.
Define now V˜i (c) = Vi (c, amaxc ) for each c ∈ [0, 1]. Then Proposition 2 brings the
desired result. unionsq
An example of a situation in which the weighted lottery mechanism works well is
when there is always a high-competent candidate for every ideological level. Formally,
this corresponds to a situation where, for every c it holds that amaxc = amax.
Note that the balanced candidate, (cα; amaxcα ), can also be implemented as a Nash
equilibrium.
5 Discussion
We have presented a very simple model that suggests a way of solving the timely
renewal ofmagistrates in someHighCourts.We have shown that when political parties
have to agree on the replacement of a High-Court judge, designated for a fixed term,
the default option significantly affects the incentives to reach an agreement. When
holding office until the agreement is reached is the default, no agreement should be
expected. When the default is a weighted lottery, then agreement will most likely
occur, prior to the lottery.4
Themodel’s extreme simplicity enables us to focus on the key aspects of the problem
and reach clear-cut conclusions. By the same token, a number of relevant aspects that
affect the appointment process in real life have been put aside. They include the
following.
The role of discounting. In our two-stage model no time discount has been con-
templated, because we implicitly assume that the period to reach an agreement is
3 This implies that party L would prefer a more able candidate, even if it is the one preferred by party R,
and viceversa. One may well think that in real life there are strategic aspects of a higher level according to
which a bad candidate of the other party may be regarded as convenient (either to discredit the proposing
party or to be less influential in the Court). We shall not consider here this aspect.
4 Note that the lottery plays here the role of final offer arbitration. Mylovanov and Zapechelnyuk (2013)
show that, in NTU environments, this type of arbitration is superior to conventional arbitration. The key
reason is that “The divergence of proposals and the restriction that the arbitrator must pick a side and cannot
modify the proposals . . . provides incentives for the parties to agree on a socially optimal outcome prior to
the arbitration.” The same basic argument applies here.
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short. When the period enabled to reach an agreement is long enough and the status
quo prevails in the meantime, results may change. More specifically, impatience may
affect the parties’ strategies and there will be a threshold beyond which it could be
preferable waiting until the lottery applies.5
The existence of a finite number of candidates. We have assumed that there are
enough eligible judges to fully cover the political spectrum. When this is not the case,
the results may also change. Things would not change much provided there is enough
variety spreading evenly over the political spectrum. Otherwise results will depend on
the distribution of the candidates. Be as it may, the case of discrete alternatives always
makes more difficult the model and entails multiple equilibria.6
Only two parties involved. The model assumes that there are only two parties so
that the universe of outcomes is either unanimity or disagreement. This is a reasonable
assumption in order to describe situations in which there are two majority parties
whose agreement is needed to make an appointment. The many-party case involves
a more complex model where the relative ideological proximity and the degree of
risk aversion will play a role in the solution of the game. The resulting equilibria will
typically depend on the ranges of utility parameters and ideological positions.
Log-rolling options. Log-rolling (Buchanan and Tullock 1962) refers here to the
possibility of making agreements in a higher dimensional space of strategies in which
compensations can take place. This larger space may involve time (here the repeated
nature of the game becomes relevant), issues (considering other committees in which
similar agreements are required), or quotas (apportioning candidates when more than
one is to be appointed).7
More complex utility functions. The model has depicted political parties whose
utilities only depend on the ideology of the candidate and on her ability (single-
dimensional and observable variables). Actual political parties have certainly richer
utility functions, which include aspects such as “social responsibility”, concern for the
public opinion, the existence of a reference point (e.g, status quo dependent utilities),
or the presence of externalities (e.g. making the decision depending on the ideological
composition of the resulting group).
Incomplete information. All relevant ingredients of the choice problem are
assumed to be publicly known. Each decision maker observes the ideology profile
and quality of the candidates and knows the utility function of the other party. Real
life decision usually involve incomplete or asymmetric information, which affects the
resulting equilibria.
5 See Porteiro (2007) for an analysis of a negotiation protocol that explicitly accounts for discounting
in the presence of a status quo and where the level of patience has direct implications on the equilibrium
negotiation strategies of players.
6 From a technical perspective, moving from a bargaining problem over a perfectly divisible issue to one
where there are indivisibilities, is far from straightforward. As the paper by Damme et al. (1990) shows,
introducing indivisibilities in the alternating-offer bargaining game of Rubinstein (1982) eliminates the
uniqueness of equilibrium (there are infinite subgame perfect equilibria, including very inefficient ones).
7 When there are several candidates that can be simultaneously replaced, the parties’ strategies become
more complex, depending on the ideological composition of the exiting judges and the changes in the
parties’ shares of seats in Parliament during the reference period. One can find different solutions in the
first stage depending on those aspects, so that agreement may be the outcome under some circumstances.
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Simplicity helps understanding the basic features of the problem and some lines
of solution, as illustrated by our model. Yet one has to bear in mind that in a richer
scenario we shall find agreements in many cases, even if the status quo is the default
option. Moreover, in a more realistic setting, there will cases in which the weighted
lottery of the proposedmechanismwill actually be played. This does not invalidate our
proposal, as deadlock still arises in even those richer environments. On the contrary,
since the lottery is a way of avoiding deadlocks that is respectful with the distribution
of power in Parliament, this new default option is superior to the existing one as it
ensures replacement in due time.
Finally, one may argue that our proposal is a totally artificial mechanism that goes
against the culture of lawyers and politicians. This is not the case.A lotterymechanism,
known as insaculation, was used for almost four centuries in Spain to appoint public
officers at different levels. This choice procedure was introduced in the fourteenth
century in order to avoid the excessive influence of some families in the management
of public affairs. A set of candidates was first selected and then pieces of paper with
their names were introduced in a bag (sacculum, in Latin) from which one was chosen
at random. Our proposal here may be regarded as following this tradition.8
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